Josh Dunigan |||

Library

List of things I have read/watched and would like to discuss with people when they have also read/watched it. If you have any further recommendations, hit me up. Counting things that I have read/watched starting 2019 (with the exception of a few things).

With most major, older works of philosophy, we usually do not read the book front to cover as they cover a wide array of topics. So some I have not read in their entirety.

Philosophy

Plato

  • Apology
  • Phaedo
  • Parmenides
  • Meno
  • Symposium
  • Republic

Kantian

Kant

  • Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals
  • Metaphysics of Morals
  • Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective
  • Towards Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch
  • On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Hold in Practice
  • The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
  • On the Supposed Right to Life from Philanthropy
  • Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
  • Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
  • On the supposed right to lie from Philanthropy
  • The Critique of Pure Reason (Has anyone actually read it though)
  • The Critique of Practical Reason
  • The Critique of the Power of Judgement
  • Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics

Christine M Korsgaard

Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account

I will call goodness in this sense the natural good.” It is because there are beings for whom things are naturally good or bad, I believe, that there is such a thing as good” and bad” in what I will call the objective” or normative” sense –the sense that is morally significant, the sense that gives us reasons. The beings who share this condition are the animals, and you and I are among them. And that gives rise to a moral question. How should we treat the others?


The Activity of Reason

A venerable tradition holds that the difference between human beings and the other animals is that human beings are rational animals, that is, animals with reason. In the philosophical tradition, reason is often identified as the active capacity or power of the mind. This identification is implicit in the contrasts generally made between reason and sensation or perception, in the theoretical realm; and between reason and passion or desire, in the practical realm. It is also explicit in the work of some of our major philosophers: in Kant’s association of reason with the mind’s spontaneity, and in Aristotle’s doctrine of the active intellect or nous, for example. Putting these two ideas together—that reason is what distinguishes us from the other animals, and that reason is some special way the active dimension of the mind—we get the thesis that the human mind is active in some way that the minds of the other animals are not, and that this activity is the essence of rationality. My project in this paper is to articulate and defend that idea. I will offer an account of why the human mind is different from the minds of the other animals, and suggest a way of characterizing the activity of reason. Although my aim is to present a view that I find compelling rather than to argue against alternative views, I do wish to contrast my view with two other views that have currency on the contemporary scene. First, there is the view that particular substantive reasons are the primary locus and source of normativity, a view I will call substantive realism” about reasons. According to this view, the work of reason is to recognize and respond to these reasons. So reason as conceived by this view is a receptive rather than a purely active faculty. Second, there is the resulting view that rationality is something different from reason. I will begin by discussing some worries I have about these views, some possible problems which I think can be traced to their failure to do justice to the activity of reason.


Creating the Kingdom of Ends

Christine Korsgaard has become one of the leading interpreters of Kant’s moral philosophy. She is identified with a small group of philosophers who are intent on producing a version of Kant’s moral philosophy that is at once sensitive to its historical roots while revealing its particular relevance to contemporary problems. She rejects the traditional picture of Kant’s ethics as a cold vision of the moral life which emphasises duty at the expense of love and value. Rather, Kant’s work is seen as providing a resource for addressing not only the metaphysics of morals, but also for tackling practical questions about personal relations, politics, and everyday human interaction. This collection contains some of the finest current work on Kant’s ethics and will command the attention of all those involved in teaching and studying moral theory.


The Relation Nature of the Good


Normativity, Necessity, and the Synthetic a priori

If I understand him correctly, Derek Parfit’s views place us, philosophically speaking, in a very small box. According to Parfit, normativity is an irreducible non-natural property that is independent of the human mind. That is to say, there are normative truths - truths about what we ought to do and to want, or about reasons for doing and wanting things. The truths in question are synthetic a priori truths, and accessible to us only by some sort of rational intuition. Parfit supposes that if we are to preserve the irreducibility of the normative, this is just about all we can say, at least until we bring in some actual intuitions to supply the story with some content.


Fellow Creatures

Christine M. Korsgaard presents a compelling new view of humans’ moral relationships to the other animals. She defends the claim that we are obligated to treat all sentient beings as what Kant called ends-in-themselves”. Drawing on a theory of the good derived from Aristotle, she offers an explanation of why animals are the sorts of beings for whom things can be good or bad. She then turns to Kant’s argument for the value of humanity to show that rationality commits us to claiming the standing of ends-in-ourselves, in two senses. Kant argued that as autonomous beings, we claim to be ends-in-ourselves when we claim the standing to make laws for ourselves and each other. Korsgaard argues that as beings who have a good, we also claim to be ends-in-ourselves when we take the things that are good for us to be good absolutely and so worthy of pursuit. The first claim commits us to joining with other autonomous beings in relations of moral reciprocity. The second claim commits us to treating the good of every sentient creature as something of absolute importance.

Korsgaard argues that human beings are not more important than the other animals, that our moral nature does not make us superior to the other animals, and that our unique capacities do not make us better off than the other animals. She criticizes the marginal cases” argument and advances a new view of moral standing as attaching to the atemporal subjects of lives. She criticizes Kant’s own view that our duties to animals are indirect, and offers a non-utilitarian account of the relation between pleasure and the good. She also addresses a number of directly practical questions: whether we have the right to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us and fight in our wars, and keep them as pets; and how to understand the wrong that we do when we cause a species to go extinct.

Varden

Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door … One More Time: Kant’s Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis

Kant’s example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant’s philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined. The problem is that Kant seems to say that it is always wrong to lie—even to a murderer asking for the whereabouts of his victim—and that if one does lie and despite one’s good intentions the lie leads to the murderer’s capture of the victim, then the liar is partially responsible for the killing of the victim. If this is correct, then Kant’s account seems not only to require us to respect the murderer more than the victim, but also that somehow we can be responsible for the consequences of another’s wrongdoing. After World War II our spontaneous, negative reaction to this appar- ently absurd line of argument is made even starker by replacing the murderer at the door with a Nazi officer looking for Jews hidden in people’s homes. Does Kant really mean to say that people hiding Jews in their homes should have told the truth to the Nazis, and that if they did lie, they became co-responsible for the heinous acts committed against those Jews who, like Anne Frank, were caught anyway? Because this is clearly what Kant argues, the critics continue, his dis- cussion of lying to the murderer brings out the true, dark side not only of Kant’s universalistic moral theory but also of Kant himself. We get the gloomy picture of a stubborn, old academic who refuses to see the inhumane consequences of his theory, and instead grotesquely defends the inhumane by turning it into an a priori, moral command.
In this paper, I argue that Kant’s discussion of lying to the murderer at the door has been seriously misinterpreted. My suggestion is that this is primarily a result of the fact that the Doctrine of Right with its conception of rightful, external freedom has been given insufficient attention in Kant interpretation. It is in the Doctrine of Right that Kant discusses rightful interaction in the empirical world. Hence it is in this work we find many of the arguments needed not only to understand his analysis of lying to the murderer in On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,” but also to analyze the added complexity the Nazi officer brings to the example. When we interpret lying to the murderer in light of Kant’s discussion in the Doctrine of Right, we can make sense of why lying to the murderer, although a wrong, is not to wrong the murderer, why we become responsible for the bad consequences of the lie, and finally why lying is to do wrong in general. The account of rightful freedom provided in the Doctrine of Right also makes it possible to see why replacing the murderer with a Nazi officer adds philosophical complexity rather than just one more reason to reject Kant’s view. The introduction of the Nazi officer requires us to consider the role of a public authority in ensuring rightful relations in general and what happens to the analysis of lying when rightful interactions as a matter of fact are no longer possible. We will see that the only time doing wrong in general by lying is legally punishable is when we lie to or as a representative of the public authority. The Nazis, however, did not represent a public authority on Kant’s view and conse- quently there is no duty to abstain from lying to Nazis. Two further strengths of Kant’s account, I propose in the final sections of the paper, lie in its ability to critique how European legal systems aimed to deal with the Nazis after the war was over and in its contribution to our understanding of the experiences of war heroes.

Sex, Love, and Gender - A Kantian Theory

Sex, Love, and Gender is the first volume to present a comprehensive philosophical theory that brings together all of Kant’s practical philosophy — found across his works on ethics, justice, anthropology, history, and religion — and provide a critique of emotionally healthy and morally permissible sexual, loving, gendered being. By rethinking Kant’s work on human nature and making space for sex, love, and gender within his moral accounts of freedom, the book shows how, despite his austere and even anti-sex, cisist, sexist, and heterosexist reputation, Kant’s writings on happiness and virtue (Part I) and right (Part II) in fact yield fertile philosophical ground on which we can explore specific contemporary issues such as abortion, sexual orientation, sexual or gendered identity, marriage, trade in sexual services, and sex- or gender-based oppression. Indeed, Kant’s philosophy provides us with resources to appreciate and value the diversity of human ways of loving and the existential importance of our embodied, social selves. Structured on a thematic basis, with introductions to assist those new to Kant’s philosophy, this book will be a valuable resource for anyone who cares about these issues and wants to make sense of them.


Justice as Freedom

Presents an overview of current intreperative traditions of Kant’s philosophy of right. Argues that the Lockean and Hobbesian interpretations fall short of Kant’s aim, which is more republican or in line with Rousseau.


Rawls vs Nozick vs Kant on Domestic Economic Justice Presents a new solution to the classic debate between Rawls and Nozick on welfare. Rawls argues that public right trumps private, while Nozick argues private trumps public. Varden offers a new solution, using Kant’s philosophy of right that says the two are not in conflict and are reconcilable as outlined in Kant’s argument for unconditional poverty relief.


Kantian Care

How do we care well for a human being: ourselves or another? Non-Kantian scholars rarely identify the philosophy of Kant as a particularly useful resource with which to understand the full complexity of human care. Kant’s philosophy is often taken to presuppose that a philosophical analysis of good human life needs to attend only to how autonomous, rational agents—sprung up like mushrooms out of nowhere, without a childhood, never sick, always independent—ought to act respectfully, and how they can be forced to interact rightfully. Questions involving aspects of human life captured by what Eva Kittay aptly phrased the fact of dependency” (1999) —such as our vulnerable, fragile, and embodied social natures, asymmetrical care relations, and deep systemic injustices—are therefore commonly thought to be beyond the grasp of Kant and of Kantian philosophy. Against this historically prominent understanding of Kant’s practical philosophy, below I engage and draw upon recent Kant scholarship which shows both the inadequacy of such rationalist readings and the fruitfulness of using Kant’s practical philosophy to enhance our understanding of human care relations. After situating my approach in the existing, relevant secondary literature on Kant’s human agent, I explore key features of Kant’s accounts of human nature and the highest good. I pay special attention to his proposal that our human nature comprises reflective and unreflective aspects and patterns that we (ought to) strive to develop, transform, and integrate in wise ways through our faculty of desire. In addition, I emphasize the dangers that our ineradicable propensity to do bad things (evil) poses for our projects of self- and other- care. I proceed by outlining how Kant’s account of moral (ethical and legal) responsibility for self and others is developed through his theories of freedom, that is, through his theory of virtue (virtuous internal freedom with its account of perfect and imperfect duties) and his theory of right (rightful external freedom with its account of innate, private, and public right).


Kant and Moral Responsibility for Animals

Varden defends Kant’s position that we do not have moral responsibilities to” animals. However, the way we treat animals can result in genuine moral failures. Addtionally, there may be other value, existential value, in the way we value animals.

Other

Restorative Justice, Retributive Justice, and the South African Truth and Reconcilliation Commission - Lucy Allais


Force and Freedom - Arthur Ripstein


Perversity of the Heart - David Sussman


For Badness’ Sake - David Sussman


Kant’s Racism - Lucy Allais


Black Radical Kantianism - Charles W. Mills


Kant’s Cosmopolitan Patriotism - Pauline Kleingeld


Hospitality’s Downfall: Kant, Cosmopolitanism, and Refugees - Adam Knowles


Kant and Cosmopolitanism - Pauline Kleingeld


Kant’s Retributivism - Done E. Scheid


Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment? - Jeffrie G. Murphy


Kant on Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution? - Thomas E. Hill, Jr.


What Kant would have said in the refugee crisis - Peter Niesen

In September 2015, while discussing the impact of the short-lived opening of its territorial borders to refugees, intellectual Germany was briefly enthralled by a debate on Kant’s Toward Perpetual Peace. While large numbers of migrants were making their way to Germany, and some German and Central European politicians voiced increasing skepticism about their claims, the philosopher Byung-Chul Han defended their universal right to residence based on Kant’s notion of hospitality. Kant held, Han argued, that every foreigner has a right to stay (Bleiberecht) in another country — according to Kant, he may remain there and not be treated with hostility ’as long as he behaves peaceably where he is’”. Han derives this interpretation from Kant’s alleged view that no one has more right than another to be on a place on earth’”.1 Of course, Han’s last quotation from Perpetual Peace leaves out the modifier originally” in no one originally had more right than another to be on a place on earth” and thus transforms a ground of past entitlement — the idea of a possession in common of the earth’s surface” (8: 358)2 — into a present day prescription. Han’s selective quotation also eclipses the qualification Kant introduced, between the two passages quoted, on the right to hospitality. Kant states that what the new arrivals can claim, based on the argument of original common ownership, is not the right to be a guest … but the right to visit” (8: 358).


Kant’s Theory of the State - Jeremy Waldron

Immanuel Kant’s theory of what we owe to the state presents an important alternative to traditional consent-based, utilitarian, and fairness-based ac- counts. On the consent-based approach, we are obligated to the state be- cause we have consented to its authority; its authority is supposed to be based on a choice we made between two morally permissible alternatives (give one’s consent to, or withhold one’s consent from state authority). On Kant’s theory, however, withholding one’s consent is impermissible. Ac- cording to the utilitarian approach, the state’s claim on us is based on the benefits it provides for others; and on the fairness approach, its claim on us is based on the moral unacceptability of our accepting these benefits with- out contributing our fair share to their provision. On Kant’s theory, how- ever, the state’s claim on us has to do not with any benefits that we receive, but with a change in the moral quality—indeed, the moral legitimacy—of certain actions of ours when they are performed under the auspices of a framework of positive law. His, therefore, is a challenging and unconven- tional theory of what we owe to the state, and it requires careful explication. The first step in such an explication is to figure out exactly what the state is, according to Kant, and to see whether his conception of the state differs from the conception that is used in political philosophy and social theory generally.


Kant and Liberal Internationalism - Michael W. Doyle

What difference do liberal principles and institutions make to the conduct of the foreign affairs of liberal states? A thicket of conflicting judgments suggests that the legacies of liberalism have not been clearly appreciated. On the one hand, for many citizens of liberal states, liberal principles and institutions have so fully absorbed domestic politics that their influence on foreign affairs tends to be either perceived as exaggerated or overlooked altogether. Liberalism becomes either unselfconsciously patriotic or inher- ently ‘peace-loving.’’ On the other hand, for many scholars and diplomats, relations among independent states appear to differ so significantly from domestic politics that the influences of liberal principles and domestic lib- eral institutions are either denied or denigrated. They judge that interna- tional relations are governed by perceptions of national security and the balance of power. Liberal principles and institutions, when they do intrude, confuse and disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-power politics. Although liberalism is misinterpreted from both these points of view, a crucial aspect of the liberal legacy is captured by each. Liberalism is a dis- tinct ideology and set of institutions that have shaped the perceptions of and capacities for foreign relations of political societies that range from social welfare or social democratic to laissez-faire. Liberalism defines much of the content of the liberal patriot’s nationalism. It does appear to disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-power politics. Thus its foreign relations cannot be adequately explained (or prescribed) by a sole reliance on the balance of power. But liberalism is not inherently ‘peace-loving,’’ nor is it consis- tently restrained or peaceful in intent. Furthermore, liberal practice may reduce the probability that states will successfully exercise the consis- tent restraint and peaceful intentions that world peace may well require in the nuclear age. Yet the peaceful intent and restraint that liberalism does manifest in limited aspects of its foreign affairs announces the pos- sibility of a world peace this side of the grave or of world conquest. Liberals have created something considerably more stable than a troubled peace constantly threatening an outbreak of war. They have strengthened the prospects for a world peace established by the steady expansion of a sepa- rate peace among liberal societies. This essay highlights the differences between liberal practice toward other liberal societies and liberal practice toward nonliberal societies. It argues that liberalism has achieved extraordinary success in the first and, yet, has contributed to exceptional confusion in the second. Appreciating these liberal legacies calls, first, for another look at one of the greatest of liberal philosophers, Immanuel Kant, for he is a source of insight, policy, and hope.


Kant’s Philosophy of History - Allen W. Wood

Kant’s writings on human history appear at first glance to constitute only a small part of his literary output and to have only marginal significance for his philosophy. Unlike some other great modern philosophers, such as Leib- niz, Hume, and Hegel, Kant was not himself a historian, not even a very well read historian of philosophy. The essays devoted chiefly to the philoso- phy of history consist in a few brief occasional pieces, such as ‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective’’ (1784) and ‘Conjec- tural Beginning of Human History’’ (1786), plus some parts of other essays, such as the one about the common saying on theory and practice (1794) or the Contest of the Faculties (1798). But if we look more closely at some of his most important works, we begin to see that views about history, even quite distinctively Kantian views, play a major role in their arguments and even in their very conception.


A Kantian Look at Climate Change - Casey Rentmeester

Kant has been dead for over 200 years (he lived from 1724 to 1804), but there are many ways in which he was way ahead of his time. His conception of nature is considered by scientists to be the essence of modern models,” he predicted something akin to the United Nations with his idea of a League of Nations,” and he thought that universes exist along a larger oscillating chain of Big Bangs and Big Crunches,” thereby anticipating the most recent cosmological theory of The Big Bounce.” Moreover, he was one of the first philosophers to lament the ecological destruction that he witnessed happening around him. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant bemoans the destruction of the pine forests near his hometown of Königsberg.


Unifying the Categorical Imperative - Marcus Arvan

This paper demonstrates something that Immanuel Kant notoriously claimed to be possible, but which Kant scholars today widely believe to be impossible: unification of all three formulations of the Categorical Imperative. §1 of this paper provides an intuitive reading of Kant’s theory of practical reason and morality according to which the threeiii formulations of the Categorical Imperative (the Universal Law Formulation, the Humanity Formulation, and the Kingdom of Ends Formulation) are identical. §2 then provides clear textual support for each premise in a formal argument for this Unifying Interpretation.


False Negatives of the Categorical Imperative- Richard McCarty

The categorical imperative can be construed as a universalization test for moral permissibility. False negatives of the categorical imperative would be maxims failing this test, despite the permissibility of their actions; maxims like: I’ll withdraw all my savings on April 15th’. Examples of purported false negatives familiar from the literature can be grouped into three general categories, and dispatched by applying category-specific methods for proper formulation of their maxims, or for proper testing. Methods for reformulating failing maxims, such as the addition of appro- priate conditional clauses, do not generate false-positive counterexamples in other instances.

  • Force and Freedom - Arthur Ripstein
  • Perversity of the Heart - David Sussman
  • For Badness’ Sake - David Sussman

Ethics

  • Utilitarianism - JS Mill
  • Nicomachean Ehics - Aristotle
  • Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy - Bernard Williams
  • The Human Prejudice - Bernard Williams
  • Speciesism and the idea of Equality - Bonnie Steinbock
  • Animal Liberation - Peter Singer (bits)
  • Famine, Affluence, and Morality - Peter Singer
  • Will Life Be Worth Living in a World Without Work? Technological Unemployment and the Meaning of Life - John Danaher
  • Why Do We Disagree About our Obligations to the Poor? - Peter Siepel
  • The Phenomenlogy of Virtue - Julia Annas
  • Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing - Julia Annas
  • Limited Aggregation and Risk - Seth Lazar
  • No Free Lunch: The Significance of Tiny Contributions - Zach Barnett
  • How Should we Aggregate Competing Claims? - Alex Voorhoeve
  • Why Does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom? - Ursula Coope
  • Right Action as Virtuous Action - Nicholas Ryan Smith
  • The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism - Alastair Norcross
  • After Solipsism - David Schmidtz
  • They Can’t Take That Away From Me: Restricting the Reach of Moralty’s Demands - Sarah Stroud
  • Scalar Consequentialism the Right Way - Neil Sinhababu
  • Suicide, Euthanasia, and Human Dignity - Friderik Klampfer
  • If Nothing Matters - Guy Kuhane
  • A Perfect Moral Storm - Stephen M. Gardner
  • Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense - Michael Otsuka
  • Eating Meat and Eating People - Cora Diamond
  • Animal Liberation or Animal Rights - Peter Singer
  • It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations - Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
  • Respect For Nature : A Theory of Environmental Ethics - Paul W. Taylor
  • Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics - J. Baird Calicott
  • Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affaird - J. Baird Calicott
  • Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism - Elliot Sober
  • Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving the Natural Environment - Tom Hill
  • Biodiversity and All That Jazz - Alan Carter
  • Must a Concern for the Environment be Centred on Human Beings? - Bernard Williams
  • The Land Ethic - Aldo Leopold
Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law - Danner and Martinez Contemporary internationalcriminal law is largely concerned with holding individual defendants responsiblefor mass atrocities.Because the crimes usually involve the concertedefforts ofmany individuals,allocating responsibility among them is of criticalimportance. This Article examines two liability doctrines-joint criminal enterprise and command responsi- bility-that play a central role in that allocation of guilt in international criminal tribunals.The Articleposits a generalframeworkfor understand- ing the development of internationalcriminallaw as an outgrowth of three legal traditions:domestic criminal law, internationalhuman rights law, and transitionaljustice. We explore the application of thatframework to joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility doctrines and argue that viewingjoint criminalenterpriseand command responsibilitythrough the lens of our framework shows the need for certain doctrinal reforms. Finally,we discuss the applicationof liability doctrines developed in the context ofinternationalcriminaltribunalsto prosecutionsfor international or transnationalcrimes in otherforums, such as domestic military tribunal prosecutionsof terrorists,that do not share the same roots as international criminallaw.
  • Leviathan - Hobbes
  • Two Treatises of Government - Locke
  • The Social Contract - Rosseau
  • Discourse on Inequality - Rosseau
  • Anarchy, State, and Utopia - Robert Nozick (bits)
  • The Origins of Totalitarianism - Hannah Arendt
  • Equality of Opportunity as Philosophy and Ideology - John Stanley
  • Transitional Justice: A Conceptual Map - Colleen Murphy
  • Causation and Responsibility - Michael S. Moore
  • Legal and Moral Responsibility - Antony Duff
  • Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity - Neta C. Crawford
  • The Implicated Subject: Beyond Victims and Perpetrators - Michael Rothberg
  • Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals - H.L.A. Hart
  • Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart - Lon L. Fuller
  • Collective Responisibility - Marion Smiley
  • Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - UN
  • Justice as Fairness - John Rawls
  • The Human Condition - Hannah Arendt
  • Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change - Simon Caney
  • Ecological Refugees, States Borders, and the Lockean Proviso - Cara Nine
  • Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change - Rebecca Tsosie
  • Does Anyone Have the Right to Sex - Amia Srinivasan
  • The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice - Colleen Murphy
  • Eichmann in Jerusalem - Hannah Arendt

Epistemology and Metaphysics

  • Is Justified Knowledge True Belief - Gettier
  • Are You a Sim? - Brian Weatherson
  • Are We Living in a Computer Simulation - Nick Bostrom
  • Physics - Aristostle
  • New Organon - Francis Bacon
  • The Assayer - Galileo di Vincenzo Bonaulti de Galilei
  • Meditations - Descartes
  • Internalism Exposed - Alvin I. Goldman
  • The Inescapability of Gettier Problems - Linda Zagzebski
  • Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology - Michael G. Titelbaum
  • Monadology - Leibniz
  • CFAR Handbook
  • Higher Order Evidence - David Christensen
  • Principles of Human Knowledge - George Berkeley
  • An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding - David Hume
  • A Treatise of Human Nature - David Hume
  • The New Riddle of Induction - Nelson Goodman
  • An Inquiry into the Human Mind - Thomas Reid
  • The Life of the Mind - Hannah Arendt

Philosophy of Mind, Science, and Psychology

  • Why Nature and Nurture Won’t Go Away - Steven Pinker
  • Recent Contributions to the Theory of Innate Ideas - Noam Chomsky
  • Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it - John B. Watson
  • The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology - Various Authors
  • The Nature of Mental States - Hilary Putnam
  • Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction - John Heil
  • The Nature of Mental States - Hilary Putnam
  • Special Science (Or: The Disunity of Science As a Working Hypothesis) - J. A. Fodor
  • Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes - Paul M. Churchland
  • Truth and Probability - Frank P. Ramsey
  • Is Neuroscience a Bigger Threat Than Artificial Intelligence - Alex Rosenberg
  • Knowing One’s Own Mind - Donald Davidson
  • Thinking Clearly About Correlations and Causation: Graphical Causal Models for
  • Observational Data - Julia M. Rohret
  • Statistical Models and Shoe Leather - David A. Freedman

Computer Science

  • Simple Rules for Complex Decisions - Jung et al
  • Shaping our Tools: Contestability as a Means to Promote Responsible Algorithmic
  • Decision Making in the Professions - Mulligan et al
  • Designing Contestability: Interaction Design, Machine Learning, and Mental Health - Hirsch et al
  • The Book of Why - Judea Pearl

Uncategorized

  • On Bullshit - Harry G. Frankfurt
  • Why Heideggerian AI Failed and Why Fixing it Would Require Making it More Heideggerian - Hubert L. Dreyfus
  • At the Hands of Persons Unkown: The Lynching of Black America - Philip Dray (few chapters)
  • Introduction to Metaphysics - Martin Heidegger
  • Being and Time - Martin Heidegger
  • The Myth of Sisyphus - Camus
  • Nausea - Sartre
  • Literature and Power - Lionel Trilling
  • Climate Change Assessments: Confidence, Probability, and Decision - Bradley et al.
  • Legacies of the Third Reich: Concentration Camps and Out-group Intolerance - Homola et al.
  • The Geography of Inequality: How Land Use Regulation Produces Segregation - Jessica Trounstine
  • The Last Messiah - Peter Zapffe

Poetry

  • Night Sky with Exit Wounds - Ocean Vuong
  • First Sunrise / Premier Soleil Levant - Yasuhiro Nakasone
  • Behind My Eyes - Li-young Lee
  • Our Death - Sean Bonney

Miscellaneous

  • Open Source Architecture - Carlo Ratti
  • The City of Tomorrow - Carlo Ratti
  • The Image of the City - Kevin Lynch
  • Three Body Problem series - Cixin Liu
  • Stand Out of Our Light - James Williams